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Policy recommendations
\ Consider non-interference in commu-
nity reintegration, but facilitate inclusive 
reintegration for young people
In rural Sierra Leone, local chiefs organised collective 
agricultural work, which facilitated interaction and  
exchange between IDPs and refugees, victims, ex-com-
batants and perpetrators of war crimes. Combined 
with ceremonial reconciliation, this led to reintegration 
and community cohesion. No external intervention 
was needed. International agencies should learn for 
such post-war engagement to let local reconciliation 
and reconstruction happen where it works well and 
avoid interference. However, indiscriminate projects 
that bring the different groups of youth together are 
crucial and need support to foster reintegration.
\ Define an exit strategy for international 
assistance of (re-)integration
The general attitude and behaviour of large population 
groups in Sierra Leone are still shaped by aid dependence, 
often resulting in their refusal to take responsibility for 
community projects or start their own initiatives for the 
benefit of communities. As a lesson, humanitarian and 
development agencies should define a clear exit strategy, 
communicate it to the receiving groups from the outset 
and stick to the strategy without making exceptions. This 
also requires a clear strategy of transferring responsibility 
to domestic authorities and societal agencies.. 
\ Support the early transformation from 
a ‘truth and reconciliation’ process after 
peace agreements towards the rule of law 
The rule of law in Sierra Leone is still not firmly estab-
lished after the war (1991–2002). While the Sierra Leone 
Special Court only treated the war crimes of top leaders, 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) strove 
for an amnesty of a large number of mid-range com-
manders, who had exposed their deeds in public and 
asked for forgiveness. As a lesson for peace processes 
elsewhere, international agencies should assist in trans-
parent cooperation between TRCs and Special Courts 
and support post-war governments in designing the 
two institutions as building blocks for the establish-
ment of the rule of law to ensure that impunity does 
not become entrenched in politics in the long term. 
\ Make sure that perpetrators do not re-
ceive more support than victims
Sixteen years after the end of the war, only very few 
victims received compensation whereas ex-combat-
ants were provided with vocational training and start-
up capital. As a lesson for future engagement of inter-
national agencies after wars, any bias towards 
perpetrators should be avoided by providing all-en-
compassing support—for reparations and compensa-
tions of war victims equally with DDR programmes, 
reintegration of displaced people and returning refu-
gees as well as reconstruction of the economy.
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During the eleven years of civil war in Sierra Leone, 
more than two million people—more than half of the 
population—were displaced. Estimations about civilian 
deaths range between 50,000 and 70,000. After the  
official end of the war and the first post-war election 
in 2002, the new government established a range of 
transitional justice institutions. These were the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC), disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration (DDR) programmes for ex-combatants, a 
reparations programme, a Human Rights Commission, 
and reformed security institutions. 
UN Resolution 1315 gave the Special Court the power 
through sub-section 4 (40) to address serious crimes 
committed against civilians and UN peacekeepers 
during the war. The Special Court Statute empowered 
the Prosecutor to bring charges for war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and other serious violations of in-
ternational humanitarian and Sierra Leonean law to 
the Special Court. The Court indicted 13 leaders of the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC), the Civil Defence Forces 
(CDF) and the then Liberian President Charles Taylor. 
It brought ten persons to trial, convicted nine persons 
and sentenced them to prison terms of 15 to 52 years.
Support the early transformation from 
a ‘truth and reconciliation’ process  
after peace agreements towards the 
rule of law  
In a separate but simultaneous process, the TRC was 
established as an externally funded government-led 
institution whose aim it was to establish restorative 
justice. The Commission submitted a thorough his-
torical analysis of the causes and context of the civil 
war and its particular cruelties, which informed a 
multi-level reconciliation process between 2003 and 
2004 (TRC, 2004). In Freetown and twelve provincial 
districts, the TRC collected 9,000 statements from  
victims of war. More than 450 perpetrators exposed 
their deeds in public and asked for forgiveness, some 
only ceremonially, though, whereas others would 
shirk the process posing as refugees eligible for  
resettlement programmes (Kelsall, 2005). District  
Reconciliation Committees in partnership with the 
Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone took over the 
process of reconciliation after that. 
A criminal justice body like the Special Court has  
punitive and retributive aims, whereas a truth and 
reconciliation body like the TRC has restorative and 
healing objectives. In a peace agreement, an amnesty 
clause for war leaders often is a precondition to 
bringing the warring parties to the negotiation table. 
Such a clause can open up an avenue for the public 
accountability of perpetrators through a truth and 
reconciliation process. The example of Sierra Leone 
shows the weakness of an approach where the two 
bodies operate simultaneously and in an uncoordi-
nated and ad hoc fashion. The contradictory objectives 
of the two institutions inevitably led to conflicts and 
hence, public confusion. In fact, the Special Court  
denied the TRC access to the top perpetrators so that 
these were not included in the public hearings. This 
constrained the operations of the TRC whose role was 
to establish accountability for the atrocities that had 
been committed during the war. Moreover, the opera-
tion of the Special Court rendered the amnesty clause 
contained in the peace agreement invalid for the 
main perpetrators. The danger of this is that combat-
ants in future wars are weary of peace agreements 
containing amnesty clauses as they do not trust them 
(TRC, 2004). Beyond this, the agenda of—in a nutshell— 
“seeking peace without justice” 1 is connected with 
the absence of a rule of law in contemporary Sierra 
Leone. The large-scale impunity for mid-range com-
manders and perpetrators has impeded the establish-
ment of a rule of law and arguably the success of  
reconciliation in the divided Sierra Leonean society  
in the long run. 
1 \ Justice Dr Binneh Kamara, Faculty of Law, Fourah Bay  
College University, in his opening speech for the stakeholder work-
shop “How can protracted displacement come to an end?  (Re-)integra-
tion and reconciliation of war-affected Sierra Leoneans and Liberians 
in a long-term perspective,” conducted by Elke Grawert, BICC and 
Sylvanus Spencer, Department of History and African Studies, in the 
framework of the BMZ- funded research project “Protected rather than 
protracted” in July 2018.
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Contemporary electoral violence: A historical legacy
Sierra Leone has successfully maintained peace since 
2002, and the general level of violence has remained 
low. Only in the context of elections, peaks of violence 
have occurred, pitting the followers of the two major 
parties against each other. These parties gain most of 
their support in regional heartlands that correlate 
with tribal groups—the Sierra Leone People’s Party 
(SLPP) in the south and east and the All People’s Con-
gress (APC) in the north and north-western regions. 
The APC is often linked to the 35 per cent Temne pop-
ulation and the SLPP to the 31 per cent Mende popula-
tion. However, there are 16 ethnic groups scattered 
across Sierra Leone that do not have any fixed party 
affiliation; moreover, people of different ethnic groups 
frequently inter-marry (Martin, 2018). The population 
in the western region including the ethnically diverse 
capital Freetown does not have a fixed party affilia-
tion. Hence, the ethnic link is only one among several 
factors that play a minor role in the regional divide.
The APC had ruled Sierra Leone in a single-party  
system for 25 years before the war.  The TRC’s investiga-
tions revealed that poor governance in all branches of 
the government had been a significant factor contrib-
uting to the violence that led to civil war between 1991 
and 2002. In hindsight, ethno-regional prejudices and 
biases in Sierra Leone threatened post-conflict reinte-
gration and reconciliation still in the early 2000s, 
fuelled by the culture of impunity and blanket amnesty. 
The continued regional division of the country was  
reflected in the election results. The first election after 
the peace agreement ended with a landslide victory  
of the SLPP in 2002. The APC won the elections in 2007 
and 2012, thus staying in power for eleven years during 
which the Sierra Leoneans perceived a significant 
marginalisation of the SLPP heartland. A growing 
number of swing constituencies in the western region 
voting for a change contributed to the victory of the 
SLPP in the election of 2018.
Whereas a moderate tone prevailed during the election 
campaign, the subsequent run-off campaign between 
the two presidential candidates was shaped by public 
rhetoric of regionalism and tribalism. Insults of the 
respective other party increased, and each party mo-
bilised young supporters to intimidate the followers 
of the other party. In several regions of Sierra Leone, 
violent attacks followed the announcement of the  
national election results in April 2018. Armed security 
forces were deployed during the second round of  
elections but rarely intervened (author’s interviews, 
Kenema, April 2018; Grawert, 2019). Of those who  
responded to a survey by the Institute for Governance 
Reform, 5.2 per cent claimed that they had experi-
enced violence personally during the 2018 elections, 
and 9.6 per cent had seen or heard of someone else 
being harassed. Sixty-one persons suffered from beat-
ings, stabbings and gunshots, mostly in the eastern 
region (Milton, 2018; Martin, 2018). The perpetrators 
were mainly youth mobilised by politicians of the 
two main parties to vandalise markets and attack 
houses of leading members of the other party. In  
several cases, motives of revenge prevailed. Spurred 
on youth responded to oaths taken publicly by indi-
viduals who had switched to the APC from SLPP, by 
claiming that they could burn the houses of these  
individuals or beat them in the assumed unlikely case 
that SLPP won the election (author’s interviews with 
inhabitants of the Eastern Region; Martin, 2018; 
Grawert, 2019).
In the aftermath of the electoral violence, Sierra 
Leonean law scholars held that the blanket amnesty 
after the truth and reconciliation process had not  
addressed impunity, war crimes, criminals and tran-
sitional justice adequately with the consequence that 
today, it seems that politicians believe that they have 
a license to mobilise others to commit violent acts 
during elections. Whereas these law scholars deplore 
that perpetrators of electoral and criminal violent acts 
are not prosecuted and attribute this to the failure to 
institutionalise the rule of law after the war, the level 
of reconciliation by the TRC is also questionable in 
light of recurrent electoral violence. Reconciliation 
may be required between victims and perpetrators  
of recent violent acts that had re-occurred in the con-
text of elections. The church-based justice and peace 
commission and an international donor-funded NGO, 
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agreement should contain a roadmap that indicates 
how to move from amnesty through a truth and rec-
onciliation process to public accountability of perpe-
trators while simultaneously, institutions upholding 
the rule of law are being built. International agencies 
should support the elected government after a peace 
agreement in pursuing such a roadmap that gradually 
leads to justice while not jeopardising peace. This 
might prevent other post-war societies from experi-
encing a recurrent re-surfacing of a deep divide in  
society that requires ever new reconciliation processes 
as in Sierra Leone.
Perpetrators should not receive more 
support than victims
Many returnees from displacement had to cope with 
adverse conditions when rebuilding their lives 
whereas ex-combatants received training and seed 
capital for reintegration within United Nations-funded 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
(DDR) programmes (Sesay & Suma, 2009). 3 The DDR 
process ran in parallel to the work of the Special 
Court and the TRC instead of being part of a well- 
coordinated transitional justice approach leading to 
the establishment of the rule of law. A separate insti-
tution, the National Commission for Social Action 
(NaCSA), coordinated and implemented the reparations 
programme and administered the Special Fund for 
War Victims, largely funded by international donors. 
NaCSA focused on the care for amputees and other 
war-wounded persons, victims of sexual violence, 
children and war widows as well as some 'indirect 
beneficiaries', such as wives and children of the eligi-
ble victims. Upon the recommendations of the TRC, 
the Government of Sierra Leone provided these 
groups with reparation benefits in health, pensions, 
education, skills training and micro-credit schemes. 
Most of these programmes have faded out because  
 
3 \ These were funded and organised by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone  
(UNAMSIL), the United Nations Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF), 
the World Bank, the World Food Programme (WFP), the ceasefire  
monitoring group of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOMOG) and other partners.
Fambultok, have conducted reconciliation activities 
in communities in those parts of Sierra Leone that 
were most affected by war atrocities. However, after 
the election of 2018, district government authorities 
claimed that they would take over the work of Fam-
bultok, and it was obvious in interviews with the  
National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA) that 
its local branches would not pursue a post-election 
violence reconciliation process but rather saw their 
responsibility in doing donor-funded social work  
(author’s interviews in Kailahun and Freetown in 
May 2018). The unsolved dilemma between a truth 
and reconciliation process and the demand to punish 
the mid-range commanders after the war is likely to 
have contributed to rising crime, violent attacks and 
acts of revenge that occurred in particular in the con-
text of national elections in Sierra Leone in 2012 and 
2018. 2
What can be learnt from Sierra Leone is that a TRC 
can be effective in restoring relations within society 
after a war in a reconciliation process that includes 
victims and perpetrators—indicated by the fact that 
the country has not relapsed into large-scale violence 
since 2002. Setting up a Special Court for the trial of 
top leaders responsible for crimes against humanity 
simultaneously, however, requires transparency and 
close coordination of the operations of the two insti-
tutions, which was missing in Sierra Leone. There 
were two outcomes: One, the punishment of a few 
top perpetrators of war crimes. Two, the creation of a 
state of vaguely ongoing transitional justice that does 
not clearly identify in which cases perpetrators—
such as those inciting electoral violence committed 
by youth—are to be held accountable and brought to 
trial. The lesson is that international agencies should 
support a determined approach that establishes the 
institutions needed to guarantee the rule of law  
already in peace agreements. As far as possible, the  
 
 
2 \ Assessment of academics and practitioners from non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) during the stakeholder workshop in Freetown in 
July 2018; statement by the Coordinator of the Justice and Peace Com-
mission, Fatorma A. Combey, Kenema in May 2018.
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Moreover, the Government of Sierra Leone prioritised 
reducing the threats from non-state armed groups 
over reintegrating youth. This attitude reaffirms the 
long history of Sierra Leonean governments neglect-
ing its youth and explains the government’s bias  
(Abdullah, 1998; Sesay & Suma, 2009). In fact, the  
reintegration of ex-combatants succeeded or failed 
depending on the extent to which the receiving com-
munity had suffered from atrocities and the degree  
of involvement of the returning ex-combatants in 
committing abuses during the war. Those who had 
witnessed lesser atrocities were more ready to reinte-
grate ex-combatants. 
When the war ended, members of nearly every armed 
group, refugees from the neighbouring countries and 
displaced people who had fled to other parts of Sierra 
Leone returned gradually to eastern Sierra Leone, where 
the war began in 1991. As the forest had encroached 
on much of the fields, local chiefs organised collective 
bush clearing and agricultural activities to produce 
food. The collective work in teams of returnees mixed 
from all groups facilitated interaction and exchange, 
even between ex-combatants and people who had 
lost family members to actions of armed groups. 
Combined with ceremonial reconciliation procedures, 
these joint activities contributed to the reintegration 
of all these groups in the community (author’s inter-
views with a variety of village inhabitants in Kailahun 
district, May 2018). No external intervention was 
needed. However, those who were deeply traumatised 
or had committed atrocities that made it impossible 
for them to face the local inhabitants ever again re-
mained in other places within Sierra Leone or across 
the border. 
The lesson for international agencies engaged in 
post-war societies elsewhere is to avoid interference 
where local reconciliation and reconstruction works 
well. At the same time, they should focus on indis-
criminate programmes that bring the different 
donors withdrew after some years. Some of the ampu-
tees still stay in separate enclosed areas, such as in 
Kenema; others live, like many other groups of poor 
people, in the streets of Freetown and other towns as 
beggars.
Most of the war victims who were not categorised in 
these special groups did not receive any compensa-
tion for the loss of family members and property. 
Many people who had been displaced and returned 
felt that the way the government and the international 
agencies dealt with perpetrators was too lenient,  
offering them undue preferential treatment compared 
with the victims (Ottendörfer, 2014). 4 NaCSA is known 
as one of the most corrupt authorities in the country; 
allegedly it had drained off much of the 80 per cent 
international funding for personal enrichment. 
As a lesson for future engagement after wars, a bias 
towards ex-combatants should be avoided by all means. 
For this purpose, international assistance after a war 
requires close coordination and encompassing sup-
port of all the processes—reparations and compensa-
tions for victims, reintegration of displaced people as 
well as ex-combatants, reconstruction of the economy 
and development programmes.
Relevance of community cohesion and 
inclusive youth programmes
An evaluation of the demobilisation and disarma-
ment process of 70,000 ex-combatants in Sierra Leone 
showed that it was successful. However, there were 
flaws in its outreach to children and youth who 
worked for armed groups in ancillary jobs and in its 
low commitment to the reintegration process. The 
agencies' priority in spending most of the available 
funds on demobilisation and disarmament was the 
main reason for that as the success of demobilisation 
and disarmament could be more easily made visible 
than success in the reintegration of ex-combatants. 
 
 
4 \ This was confirmed by interviews the author conducted with Sierra 
Leoneans who had been displaced during war and returned and with 
ex-combatants from all non-state armed groups between April and 
July 2018.
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groups of youth together in joint activities—and not 
exclusively distinguish between ex-combatants, vic-
tims and returnees. An inclusive focus on the reinte-
gration of youth—those who had carried arms, did 
ancillary jobs in the war economy, who had been dis-
placed and were victimised—should be at the core of 
future reintegration programmes. They all need skills 
training, employment or an opportunity to receive 
seed capital to set up a business and social recognition 
within a community.
Need for an exit strategy
Aid agencies identified widows, amputees, disabled 
people, orphans, sexually abused people, etc. as par-
ticularly vulnerable groups and provided some with 
individual reparations. Locally integrating Liberian 
refugees received support for many years. The different 
treatment created high expectations among the  
beneficiaries and greed and perceptions of injustice 
among others. Over the years, the general attitude 
and behaviour of large population groups has further-
more been shaped by aid dependence, often resulting 
in a common refusal to take on responsibility for 
community proj-ects and starting independent initi-
atives for the benefit of communities.
The lesson for humanitarian and development agen-
cies from Sierra Leone is that in post-war situations 
elsewhere, they should define a clear exit strategy, 
communicate it to the receiving groups from the  
outset and stick to the strategy without making ex-
ceptions. This also requires a clear strategy of trans-
ferring responsibility to domestic authorities or agen-
cies, which also includes gradually taking over the 
funding themselves.
In conclusion, the impunity of junior commanders of 
armed groups has had damaging effects on the realm 
of politics and democratic voting, as remnants of the 
cruel behaviour during a war remain alive and appear 
to be justifiable in parts of society. The outcome of the 
truth and reconciliation process that ran in parallel 
to the prosecution of top war criminals by the Sierra 
Leone Special Court has impeded the establishment 
of the rule of law in the country. If the rule of law 
were in place, citizens could bring perpetrators to 
justice and would no longer have to revert to mutual 
revenge acts incited by politicians who get away 
with it without a court trial. The rule of law and a 
clear division of powers that make it possible to hold 
politicians accountable for their actions in front of 
an independent judiciary still need to be strength-
ened to avoid this pattern of an assumed license to 
commit violence from re-emerging again. As a lesson 
for other post-war countries, international agencies 
should take on a long-term perspective and link  
special courts and TRCs with the establishment of 
institutions ensuring the rule of law. As concerns 
support for reintegration, humanitarian and devel-
opment agencies should avoid generating separate 
target groups but focus on indiscriminate pro-
grammes that bring the youth together in education, 
training, employment and business start-up pro-
grammes. A bias towards compensating perpetrators 
while most victims do not receive similar assistance 
should be overcome through an inclusive reintegra-
tion process after a war. Where communities man-
age reintegration on their own, international agen-
cies do not need to interfere at all. All foreign-funded 
programmes should have a clearly communicated 
exit strategy from the outset to protect post-war 
communities from aid dependency.
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